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I. Introduction 
 
 One of the lasting lessons of the Obama presidential campaigns, both in 2008 and 2012, 
was its success in the ground game.  This success is touted not only by the mainstream media (see 
Ball 2012; Sinderbrand 2012), but political scientists as well (Chen & Reeves, 2011; Osborn, 
McClurg, & Knoll, 2010; Panagopoulos & Francia, 2009).  One way in which the Obama 
campaigns flexed their muscle was their numerical advantage in field offices.  In 2008, Obama’s 
ability to raise massive amounts of money, in conjunction with a massive network of campaign 
volunteers helped him establish over 700 field offices across the country, compared to less than 
400 for Senator John McCain.  In 2012, his advantage was even wider:  786 field offices 
compared to Mitt Romney’s 284 (Sides, 2012). 
 While the sheer number of Obama field offices compared to his Republican opponents 
reflects contrasting campaign strategies, it is worth asking if this advantage helped him win both 
elections.  Is the conventional wisdom surrounding the dominance of the Obama ground game 
valid?  Did Obama’s field office advantage come through for him on Election Day?  This study 
explores the impact of field offices on general election results for the 2008 and 2012 presidential 
campaigns in the consummate battleground state of Ohio and makes two key contributions to 
the elections literature.  First, previous literature explores the impact of field offices at the county 
level, although the purpose of Obama field offices was to serve as the campaign’s community 
hub.  While we replicate the model specifications in these studies, we present the first study of 
presidential field offices that makes use of spatial regression to account for the inherent spatial 
autocorrelation of local politics.  Second, we demonstrate that the Obama field office advantage 
in the Buckeye State led to electoral benefits.  A community’s proximity to an Obama field office 
led to a substantively significant increase in vote share in 2012 as well as an increase in voter 
turnout in both 2008 and 2012.  A key implication of this finding is that campaigns have an 
incentive to decentralize their ground game rather than concentrating their firepower in a few 
locations. 
 
 
II. Campaign Effects & Presidential Field Offices 
 
Many early scholars in the elections subfield marginalized the effect of campaigns on 
election outcomes.  Despite all of the money, debates, and public attention, evidence of campaign 
effects eluded political scientists for decades.  These works conclude that voters make up their 
minds well in advance of Election Day (Berelson, Lazarsfeld, & McPhee, 1986; Lazarsfeld & 
Gaudet, 1968), that partisanship is highly stable and thus limits a campaign’s impact (Campbell, 
Converse, Miller, & Stokes, 1960), or that certain structural variables such as the economy and 
incumbent approval ratings can adequately explain electoral results without accounting for 
campaign activity (Lewis-Beck & Rice, 1992).   
The last 15-20 years of elections literature has changed this narrative by establishing a link 
between campaign activities and increased voter mobilization.  In particular, a burgeoning 
literature utilizing field experiments focuses on the impact of get-out-the-vote (GOTV) activities 
such as door-to-door canvassing, phone calls and direct mail.   Door-to-door campaigning, valued 
for its ability to create face-to-face contact between a campaign and potential voters, is seen as a 
particularly economical way to increase voter mobilization, in some cases as high as 11 percent 
(Gerber and Green 2000; Alvarez, Hopkins, and Sinclair 2010; Sinclair, McConnell, and 
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Michelson 2013; but see Nickerson, Friedrichs, and King 2006).  Additional scholars explore the 
link between phone calls and mobilization with mixed results.  Whereas early experimental work 
concluded that phone calls were not an effective tactic to mobilize voters in a nonpartisan 
campaign (Gerber & Green, 2000), ensuing studies produced more nuanced results.  Specifically, 
phone canvassing can significantly increase turnout in partisan elections regardless of whether the 
calls are made by volunteers or professionals (Nickerson, 2005, 2007; Nickerson et al., 2006).  
Moreover, the timing of phone calls can be important; Alvarez, Hopkins, and Sinclair (2010) find 
that potential voters contacted either in-person or via phone during the final week of the campaign 
are more likely to vote than those contacted earlier. 
These recent experimental studies frequently validate some non-experimental studies in 
finding a link between campaign efforts and voter mobilization.  Caldeira, Clausen, and Patterson 
(1990), in an analysis of the 1986 Ohio statewide elections, note that campaigning and partisan 
efforts to increase voter turnout were successful, as those who received campaign literature and 
were contacted by a political party were significantly more likely to vote.  Other scholars show 
that high-profile presidential campaign events such as debates and party conventions increase the 
likelihood of voting among both intended voters and those more hesitant to cast a ballot (Hillygus, 
2005; Hillygus & Jackman, 2003).  Parties also play a role in mobilizing the electorate; as they 
spend more on GOTV efforts, turnout likewise increases (Holbrook & McClurg, 2005).    
 Campaigns have noticed the importance of GOTV efforts and begun to implement them in 
an effort to increase turnout among base supporters (Kramer, 1970).  As Panagopoulos and 
Wielhouwer (2008) note, campaigns are increasingly contacting voters, finding that both the Kerry 
and Bush campaigns vigorously courted their base voters in 2004.  Holbrook and McClurg (2005) 
find that a political party’s spending advantage not only increases turnout among its partisans, but 
also changes the victory margin.  Of course, the composition of the electorate does not merely 
have to be stated in partisan terms; as the parties seek to identify potential supporters, they identify 
any individual who may be predisposed to vote for their candidate.  For instance, low-income 
voters in battleground states were more likely to be interested and involved in the 2004 presidential 
election due to the campaigns’ investment in these key states (Gimpel, Kaufmann, & Pearson-
Merkowitz, 2007). 
 While the preponderance of evidence indicates that campaigns play a significant role in 
elections, we are uncertain how these GOTV efforts affect a candidate’s vote share, particularly at 
the presidential level.   This is where we may see the importance of field offices.  Field offices 
play a critical role in a presidential campaign by serving as a hub for its GOTV efforts.  The typical 
Obama 2012 field office had at least one staffer, served as a recruitment center for local volunteers, 
provided a central location for campaign events, phone banking and data collection, and allowed 
a campaign to develop local insight, build detailed voter files on potential supporters, field test the 
best ways to motivate them, and push them to the polls (Sinderbrand, 2012).  By establishing local 
offices in critical areas throughout a battleground state, a national campaign can keep up with the 
vast amounts of voter information coming in.  As Masket (2009) points out, coordinating massive 
GOTV campaigns requires recruiting thousands of volunteers to make phone calls and go door-to-
door.   
Despite the importance of field offices, little is known about how they can impact an 
election.  Indeed, only three studies explore the relationship between field offices and election 
results.  Presidential campaigns will invest in areas where their support is strongest and tend to 
place an office in swing areas if their opponent has already done so.  The evidence suggests that 
field offices are effective in mobilizing voters (Darr & Levendusky, 2014).  For instance, Obama’s 
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2008 campaign was particularly successful in utilizing field offices to their advantage, increasing 
his share of the two-party vote by roughly one percent and yielding an additional 207,000 votes in 
swing states (Darr & Levendusky, 2014; Masket, 2009).  Finally, while the 2012 Obama ground 
game added to his vote totals nationwide, these gains were not the difference maker in the Electoral 
College – he would have defeated Romney without as robust a ground game (Masket, Sides, & 
Vavreck, 2016; Sides & Vavreck, 2013). 
Despite recent progress in understanding how presidential field offices influence electoral 
outcomes, much remains unknown.  For instance, while Masket (2009) concluded that field offices 
helped Obama across 11 battleground states in 2008, his findings generally lost statistical 
significance when disaggregated by state.1  This study attempts to address this gap by focusing on 
the placement of field offices across the state of Ohio in the 2008 and 2012 presidential elections.  
In the lead-up to the 2012 presidential election, Nate Silver (2012) calculated that Ohio had a 49.8 
percent chance of providing the decisive electoral vote.  As the quintessential battleground state, 
each presidential campaign rigorously courted the state’s nearly 5.5 million voters.  This makes 
Ohio a perfect case study for determining how field offices impact election outcomes. 
 
III. Why Field Office Proximity Matters 
 
A. Theoretical Overview 
  
Our theoretical expectations are straightforward and intuitive:  field offices will have the 
strongest impact on communities closest to them.  There are two components to this logic.  First, 
we demonstrate that localized social interactions spread throughout and between proximal 
communities.  In other words, campaign activity stemming from a field office has a “spillover 
effect” across community lines.  As Darr and Levendusky (2014) recognize, the intended effects 
of a field office spread beyond community border.  Jeremy Bird, Obama’s 2012 national field 
director noted, “Our focus is on having a very decentralized, organized operation as close to the 
precinct level as possible…It’s real, deep community organizing in a way we didn’t have time to 
do in 2008” (Ball, 2012, para. 17).   The emphasis on community organizing and voter mobilization 
in the era of big data and micro targeting fits well with the mantra that “all politics is local.”  Thus, 
while the Masket (2009) and Darr and Levendusky (2014) studies explore the effect of field offices 
at the county level, we lose the nuance of the truly local campaign efforts that take place at a field 
office. 
 The second component of our logic rests in understanding why a campaign wants to 
organize GOTV efforts at the local level.  Campaign consultants acknowledge that getting 
neighbors to reach out to their communities is critical to GOTV operations.  According to Jeremy 
Bird, 
Community organizing is not a turnkey operation.  You can’t throw up some phone 
banks in late summer and call that organizing.  These are teams that know their 
turfs – the barber shops, the beauty salons; we’ve got congregation captains in 
churches.  These people know their communities (Ball, 2012, para. 18). 
 
Another Obama campaign official confirms this notion, stating that the campaign “wanted 
as many of [its] local people carrying your message as possible, as opposed to paid field 
organizers, or even imported volunteers from different parts of the country” (Masket, 2009, 
p. 1026).  As Masket et al. (2016) note, presidential campaigns use phone and in-person 
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communication to persuade and/or mobilize specific voters.  In short, there is a strategic 
element to keeping a nationwide campaign as local as possible. 
Political science has in many ways validated the role of social context on voter 
mobilization; politically active individuals interact with other politically active individuals 
(Fowler, 2005; Nickerson, 2008; Schram & van Winden, 1991).  McClurg (2003) argues that social 
interaction plays an important role in politics and that political discussion in particular leads to an 
increased likelihood of electoral participation.  Scholars also find that voters are more likely to be 
influenced by campaigners from their own community and that the more personalized the contact, 
the more effect the contact is in increasing turnout (Nickerson, 2007; Sinclair et al., 2013).   
Finally, Allen et al. (2014) argue that within the social context of a campaign, a 
community’s proximity to a field office reflects the reality that campaign resources are limited, 
particularly in terms of volunteer hours.  Opening more campaign offices within a certain distance 
of targeted communities minimizes volunteer commutes and allows the campaign to canvass in 
high-traffic areas that are close to the office.  As a result, those who live closer to a field office 
have more contact with a campaign than those who live farther away, leading to a more politically 
charged climate.  This can lead to both increased electoral performance for a particular campaign 
and increased voter mobilization overall. 
 
 
B. How Proximity is Measured and the Obama Campaign’s Field Office Advantage 
 
If we are correct that field office proximity matters for campaign mobilization, then two 
questions should be addressed.  First, how is proximity measured?  We collected information on 
each of the presidential field offices in the 2008 and 2012 elections.2  Each field office was 
geocoded based on its address.  We then calculated the geographic centroid of each Ohio 
community in ESRI’s ArcMap 10.2, which allowed us to count of the number of Democratic and 
Republican field offices within 10 miles of a community. 
The second question is descriptive in nature: Did the Obama campaign have a field office 
advantage?  Figures 1 and 2 provide a straightforward answer: The Obama campaigns simply 
dominated his GOP counterparts in the number and dispersion of field offices.  In 2008 (Figure 1) 
Barack Obama held an 82 – 9 advantage with field offices in over half of Ohio’s 88 counties.  
Equally as impressive as his numerical advantage, his ground game had a physical presence in all 
regions of the state.  John McCain, on the other hand, maintained a field office in most of the 
populous counties:  Cuyahoga (Cleveland) and Stark (Canton) in the northeast; Hamilton 
(Cincinnati), Butler (Hamilton) and Montgomery (Dayton) in the southwest; Franklin (Columbus) 
and Delaware (Delaware) in the center; and Lucas (Toledo) in the northwest.  Outside of these 
major metropolitan areas, however, his campaign had no physical presence.   
The descriptive statistics (see Table 1) suggest that, as Darr and Levendusky (2014) find, 
the McCain and Obama campaigns utilized divergent strategies.  The Obama campaign invested 
heavily in their core areas, but still placed numerous field offices in traditionally Republican areas, 
particularly in the western part of the state.  For instance, despite placing field offices in Defiance 
and Henry counties (northwest corner of the state), Obama failed to win a majority of the vote in 
any of these communities.  Only one community, Huntington Township in rural Brown County, 
was over 50 miles from the most proximal Obama/Biden ’08 field office.  More impressively, the 
average community was only 13.61 miles from the closest office, and half of Ohio’s communities 
were within 7.18 miles of an office.  The typical community had just under one Obama field office 
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within 10 miles of its center, although many communities in Cuyahoga County, such as Cleveland, 
Shaker Heights, and University Heights had in upwards of 8-10 field offices in close proximity. 
The McCain campaign tended use field offices in Republican strongholds.  Their 
placements in southwest Ohio illustrate this well:  while they had an office in Cincinnati, it was 
on the western edge of the city, close to the heavily Republican suburbs.  They had another office 
in Hamilton, a county north of Cincinnati, another traditional GOP stronghold.3  In a stark contrast 
to the Obama campaign, the average community was just over 43 miles from the closest 
McCain/Palin Victory Center, and 22 communities were at least 100 miles away.  Finally, over 
half of Ohio’s communities were at least 22+ miles from a McCain victory center, while a handful 
of suburban Dayton communities had two victory centers within 10 miles.  These statistics clearly 
demonstrate the disparate ground game strategies by the two campaigns. 
 Four years later, there was again a significant numerical discrepancy in field offices (Figure 
2).  While the Romney campaign increased the number of GOP Victory Centers to 40, the Obama 
campaign saturated the state with 131 field offices.  Similar to the 2008 campaign, Obama’s field 
offices were dispersed across the whole state, with the southeast being the only exception.  The 
Obama campaign opened 13 offices in Cuyahoga County, 12 offices in Franklin County, and 7 in 
Hamilton County.  While the major cities, all heavily Democratic, were blanketed with Obama 
field offices, the campaign again took some risks by placing offices in the western part of the state 
and exurban Columbus.  Every community was within 50 miles of an Obama field office, while 
the average community was a mere 11.79 miles away. Impressively, over half of the communities 
were within six miles of a field office, meaning many communities were very accessible to 
Obama’s ground game volunteers. 
The Romney campaign was more proactive than the McCain team in their placement of 
field offices, although many of their strongest communities were nowhere near a field office.  This 
is particularly true in western and southeastern Ohio, where many communities were over 60 miles 
from a campaign field office.  Overall, the average community was over 20 miles from a 
Romney/Ryan Victory Center and half were over 10 miles away; both of these distances were 
roughly double their Obama/Biden counterparts. 
 
 
C. Hypotheses 
 
These divergent ground game strategies provide a natural arena to test systematically the 
impact of field office locations on the outcomes of the 2008 and 2012 presidential elections.  Given 
that presidential campaigns emphasize community-based voter mobilization efforts and that 
neighbors can have larger mobilization effects than non-neighbors, and the Obama campaigns’ 
distinct field office advantage, we deduce the following relationships: 
 
 H1a:  Proximity to a Democratic field office will increase the share of the Democratic 
candidate’s vote share. 
 H1b:  Proximity to a Republican field office will lower the share of the Democratic 
candidate’s vote share. 
H2:  Proximity to a field office will increase voter turnout. 
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IV. Data, Spatial Autocorrelation, and Spatial Regression 
 
Testing the above hypotheses requires the construction of two straightforward dependent 
variables.  The first set is the two-party vote for the major party nominees in both 2008 and 2012. 
The second dependent variable is the percentage of voter turnout in each year, calculated as the 
number of presidential voters divided by registered voters.  Because we are interested in the 
influence of field offices at the community level rather than the county, we use the Census 
Bureau’s county subdivisions as the unit of analysis.  There are two benefits for using county 
subdivisions: they are at the sub-county level of analysis, and the Census provides a myriad of data 
for these communities through the 5-year American Community Survey (ACS).4  In 2008 there 
were 1,585 county subdivisions in Ohio; in 2012 there were 1,605.  This means that nearly 99 
percent of county subdivisions were unchanged after the 2010 Census.  Following the analyses by 
Masket (2009) and Darr and Levendusky (2014), we include a standard battery of control 
variables, including the population of each community, the percent African American population, 
the percent Latino population, the percent senior population, the median household income,  the 
unemployment rate, and the percent within a college degree.  We also include controls for the 
number of campaign ads run by each party and their allies in 2008 (Goldstein, Niebler, Neiheisel, 
& Holleque, 2011) and 2012 (Fowler, Franz, & Ridout, 2017), along with the number of 
presidential and vice presidential candidate visits to each community (Democracy in Action, n.d.; 
George Washington University, n.d.).  Finally, we control for partisanship by including the 
Democratic presidential candidate’s share of the vote from the previous election (listed as Dem 
percentt-1 in the models).  For the 2008 model, this is John Kerry’s 2004 performance; for 2012 
this is Barack Obama’s 2008 performance. 
Similar to Tam Cho and Gimpel (2010), we utilize spatial analysis to determine the impact 
of field office location on election results.  While typical ordinary least squares regression may do 
an adequate job of explaining the average effect of interest, it is reasonable to believe that an 
analysis of individual communities may lead to spatial autocorrelation.  Spatial autocorrelation is 
perhaps best embodied by Tobler’s First Law of Geography, which states “Everything is related 
to everything else, but near things are more related than distant things” (ESRI N.D.a).  In other 
words, communities and their associated data tend to be clustered together in space (ESRI N.D.b).   
First, the theoretical expectation is that field offices will impact the election due to the social 
interactions at the community level.  The vigor of such community-based outreach can be expected 
to create spatial autocorrelation.  Second, patterns of interactions between campaign volunteers 
and voters associated with modern campaign tactics such as micro targeting may heighten causal 
effects in some locations while depressing them in others.  The intent of GOTV efforts is for 
contacts by a local office to spread beyond town borders (Darr & Levendusky, 2014).  Finally, 
many communities have unique and complicated historical and cultural forces that impact political 
attitudes and behaviors. 
Table 2 further verifies the presence of spatial autocorrelation:  the global Moran’s I test 
statistic is significant for all four dependent variables, allowing us to reject the null hypothesis that 
there is no spatial autocorrelation.  The presence of spatial autocorrelation requires us to utilize 
some form of spatial regression to combat the spatial autocorrelation.  Anselin (2005) specifies 
two types: a spatial lag model and a spatial error model.  The former includes a spatially lagged 
dependent variable while the latter incorporates a spatial autoregressive error term.  Based on our 
theory that a community’s distance from a field office plays a significant role in turnout and 
candidate performance, we use spatial error models.   
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V. Does Field Office Location Impact Presidential Election Results? 
  
Table 3 displays the results of the spatial regressions with the 2008 and 2012 Democratic 
(Obama) vote share as the dependent variable.  In terms of goodness-of-fit, two measures indicate 
that the spatial regressions are an improvement over the traditional OLS models.  First, the Akaike 
information criterion (AIC) decreases by moving from an OLS model to a spatial regression (see 
Table 1), suggesting the spatial regressions improve the overall model fit.5  Second, the spatial 
regression R-Squares for the overall 2008 and 2012 election results (first two columns of Table 2) 
are all at least 0.92, and the R-Squares for the turnout models range from 0.74 to 0.81.  While the 
spatial regression R-Squares are not directly comparable to their OLS counterparts, they suggest 
that we are able to explain a significant amount of the variation in the dependent variables and that 
the spatial regressions are likely an improvement over the OLS models. 
 In examining the control variables, we see that many of the same factors that explain the 
national vote likewise explain the Ohio results.  In 2008, communities that saw more Obama-
affiliated TV ads, more densely populated and had higher percentages of African Americans, 
Latinos, college educated, and unemployed individuals gave Obama a higher share of the vote.  
Communities with higher median household incomes, on the other hand, tended to vote in higher 
propensity for McCain.  The 2012 results were very similar except that the percent of unemployed 
individuals in a community was not statistically significant. 
Moving on to our key explanatory variables, we find that the impact of field offices on 
presidential election results in Ohio is more complicated than prior research indicates.  While the 
2008 Obama campaign championed a new way of thinking about field office placement and GOTV 
operations, the spatial regression results indicate that they did not make a difference.  In fact, 
proximity to 2008 McCain victory centers significantly impacted Obama’s performance in a 
community, providing evidence in support of Hypothesis 1b.  For each McCain/Palin victory 
center within 10 miles of community, Obama’s share of the vote was expected to decrease by 0.74 
percent.  Unfortunately for the McCain campaign, most communities were not within 10 miles of 
a victory center, meaning the campaign’s ground game did not make a substantive impact across 
the state.  These findings also suggest that Obama’s victory could be due to the context of the 2008 
election.  President Bush was unpopular, the economy was in the midst of the Great Recession, 
and Obama had a significantly larger campaign war chest.   
While field office proximity did not play a key role in Obama’s 2008 Ohio performance, 
his 2012 ground game was much more impressive.  Not only did the campaign increase the number 
of field offices statewide, their ground game was much more effective.  On average, each field 
office within 10 miles of a community added an expected 0.19 percent to Obama’s vote share.  
With the average community having 1.33 field offices within 10 miles, this translated to nearly an 
additional one-quarter of a percent.  More importantly, in communities saturated by Obama field 
offices (greater than two standard deviations away from the mean), this equated to an expected 
0.75 percent of the vote.  In some areas of the state, particularly Cleveland and Columbus, his 
campaign dedicated significant GOTV resources, placing in upwards of 9 – 12 field offices within 
10 miles.  The results from the spatial regression indicate that Obama received an expected 1.71 – 
2.28 percent increase in his vote share from these field offices.  These 2012 findings validate 
Obama’s strategy to keep his field operations intact in the battleground states after the 2008 
election and ramp up as November, 2012 approached (see Lake, Klaidman, and Jacobs 2012).  The 
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Obama 2008 campaign laid the groundwork for 2012 in many of the same ways the 2002 GOP 
voter mobilization strategy set the state for Bush’s 2004 72-hour GOTV program. 
While the end goal of a campaign is to win the election, mobilization is ultimately about 
turnout.  Much of the recent literature on campaign effects focuses on turnout rather than results 
(e.g., Enos & Fowler, 2014; McGhee & Sides, 2011; McKee, Hood III, & Hill, 2012).  As such, 
Table 4 displays spatial regression model results using turnout in 2008 and 2012 as the dependent 
variables.  Overall, the models explain quite a bit of the variation in turnout and represent an 
improvement over using traditional OLS regression. 
 Among the control variables in the 2008 model, communities with high population density, 
unemployment, and African American populations saw lower turnout, while those exposed to 
more TV ads, more senior citizens, college educated adults, and income saw higher turnout.  The 
2012 results were largely similar, although the Latino share of the population was statistically 
significant while population density and ad exposure were not. 
 More importantly for our analysis, the key explanatory variables were statistically 
significant in the expected direction.  In 2008, each Obama field office located within 10 miles of 
a community turnout increased by an expected 0.32 percent.  Given that the average community 
had 0.82 proximal Obama field offices, this translated to almost a 0.26 percent increase in turnout.  
Among communities that were one standard deviation above the mean, turnout was expected to 
increase by 0.43 percent.  Finally, among the most targeted communities (those with 8 – 10 
proximal offices), turnout was expected to rise by between 2.56 percent and 3.2 percent. 
 The Obama ground was equally effective in increasing turnout during the 2012 campaign.  
Each of his field offices located within 10 miles of a community turnout increased by an expected 
0.27 percent.  For the typical community, this translated to an increase of 0.36 percent.  Among 
communities that were one standard deviation above the mean, turnout was expected to increase 
by 0.53 percent.  Finally, among the most targeted communities (those with 9 – 12 proximal 
offices), turnout was expected to rise by between 2.43 percent and 3.24 percent.  Given that these 
communities were in the most densely populated areas of the state, we can see why his ground 
game was able to increase his popular vote margin. 
While there is evidence that the Obama ground game was effective in increasing turnout 
in 2008 and 2012, and vote sharing in 2012, the same cannot be said for Republicans.  McCain 
spent half as much money on staffing as Obama and he scaled back the Bush 72-hour GOTV plan 
in an effort to finance television advertising.  Furthermore, multiple media outlets reported that 
many McCain Victory Centers were actually closed during the campaign stretch-run; when they 
were open, they had reduced hours (Mosk, 2008; Quinn, 2008).   
While the GOP’s lack of effectiveness in 2008 was not very surprising, 2012 is a different 
story.  In the lead up to Election Day, the conventional wisdom was that the Romney ground game, 
while not quite on par with Obama’s, was much better than McCain’s (Joseph & Stanage, 2012).  
Yet the Romney ground game was widely panned in the 2012 post-mortem.  Its data system, 
Project Orca, crashed on Election Day.  As one campaign official noted, “I think it’s fair to say 
that pretty much everything about the system that was supposed to work actually failed”.  Despite 
the gloom-and-doom attitude from one official, the Romney campaign argued that Orca was able 
to help mobilize over 14 million voters over the course of the campaign (Lake et al., 2012).  Still, 
despite the greater emphasis on GOTV in 2012 compared to 2008, evidence suggests that, if 
anything, the 2008 ground game was more effective in Ohio than the 2012 version.   
 All told, the 2012 results mirror Masket’s (2009) and Darr and Levendusky’s (2014) 
findings at the county level nationwide.  The substantive lesson from these numbers is that, at the 
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margins, an emphasis on the ground game can make a difference.  Saturating a battleground state 
with field offices does not change the fundamentals of an election, as we saw in 2008.  Yet in an 
era of relatively close presidential elections (like in 2012), this strategy can maximize a candidate’s 
chances of success. 
  
VI. Conclusion 
  
This study adds evidence to the argument that campaigns, and more specifically voter 
mobilization efforts, can affect election results.  By replicating Masket’s (2009), Darr and 
Levendusky’s (2014) and Sides et al (2016) model specifications while actually controlling for 
spatial correlation, we find that a community’s proximity to a presidential field office can make a 
difference.  Evidence consistently indicates that Obama’s field offices added to his overall share 
of the vote in the 2012 election in communities across the key battleground state of Ohio.  On top 
of that, we find that his ground game increased voter turnout in both election cycles.  While 
Obama’s ground game was successful, his Republican counterparts struggled.  McCain’s victory 
centers statistically increased his performance, but its substantive impact was negligible.  
Romney’s ground game was completely ineffective.  For the GOP candidates, the distance between 
their victory centers and the communities they were trying to reach was too great to be effective.  
These findings dovetail nicely not only with studies done by Masket (2009) and Darr and 
Levendusky (2014), they support on-the-ground observations by political reporters and pundits.  
 While these findings are both interesting and important, we would be remiss not to discuss 
their limitations.  First, this study covers just the state of Ohio.  While Ohio is a microcosm of the 
nation in some ways (African American population, median household income), it differs in others 
(such as Latino population) (United States Census Bureau, 2013).  Second, even among other 
battleground states, Ohio received considerable attention from both parties in 2008 and 2012.  For 
instance, there were more Obama field offices in Ohio in 2012 than in any other state; the only 
state with more Romney offices was Florida.  In other words, the ground game was arguably more 
intense in the Buckeye State than any other.  Given the costs of a field office in terms of money, 
staff, and volunteers, it simply may not be possible to replicate such intensity across every 
battleground state. 
 Furthermore, there were other elections occurring in Ohio in these years, including a 
contentious U.S. Senate in 2012 in which the incumbent, Sherrod Brown (D) defeated his 
challenger, John Mandel, by a wider margin than did President Obama.  While political scientists 
often explore the impact of presidential elections on down ballot races (e.g., Campbell, 1986; 
Campbell & Sumners, 1990; Ferejohn & Calvert, 1984; Halberstam & Montagnes, 2015), there is 
little known about how Brown’s popularity (or Mandel’s weaknesses) may have affected the 
Obama-Romney election.  Future research should explore such potential impacts of other high 
profile, statewide elections on presidential election results in local communities. 
 Another limitation to this study is the scope of the findings.  While field office proximity 
can influence a candidate’s share of the vote, it will not fundamentally alter the electoral context.  
Thus, while the McCain campaign received some criticism for eschewing a stronger ground game 
for a more wide-reaching television ad campaign, their decision was reasonable.  Even with a 
robust ground game on par with then-Senator Obama, McCain was not going to overcome the 
structural headwinds faced in 2008.  Our results, similar to Masket (2009) and Osborn et al (2010), 
indicate that the ground game makes a difference at the margins.  In close elections, it can tip the 
balance in favor of one candidate over another, but it will only do so much. 
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  There is a practical implication of these results as well.  In an era of microtargeting and 
big data, presidential campaigns must be able to reach every potential voter.  As such, this study 
provides validation for the idea that local community-based mobilization efforts are superior to a 
more regional approach.  This also suggests that presidential candidates should adopt a similar 
strategy to the Obama campaigns to maximize their showing on Election Day.  Rather than pick a 
handful of locations for their field offices, campaigns should make an effort to pay attention to the 
geographic location of their campaign efforts.   
 Finally, further studies should make an effort to explore quantity versus quality.  Simply 
blanketing a state with field offices is likely not sufficient to affect the election results.  There must 
be an element of quality associated with the ground game.  Based on reports highlighted throughout 
this study, the Obama campaigns not only had a numerical advantage in field offices, but a 
qualitative one as well.  Elections scholars need to find a way to quantify such advantages.  
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Figure 1:  Presidential Campaign Results & Field Offices, 2008 
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Figure 2:  Presidential Campaign Results & Field Offices, 2012 
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Table 1:  Descriptive Statistics for Key Variables 
 
Variable 
Statistic 
N Mean Median Min. Max. Standard 
Deviation 
DEM offices within 10 miles, 2012 1,593 1.33 1 0 12 1.98 
GOP offices within 10 miles, 2012 1,593 0.39 0 0 4 0.70 
DEM offices within 10 miles, 2008 1,592 0.82 0 0 10 1.37 
GOP offices within 10 miles, 2008 1,592 0.09 0 0 2 0.31 
DEM Vote Share, 2012 1,585 41.58 40.26 5.57 99.58 12.97 
DEM Vote Share, 2008 1,581 43.16 41.90 9.78 99.47 11.93 
DEM Vote Share, 2004 1,576 40.33 38.96 6.44 95.87 12.40 
Voter Turnout, 2008 1,580 70.22 70.95 34.44 85.01 6.64 
Voter Turnout, 2012 1,585 68.94 69.63 31.26 95.94 7.23 
Population Density 2012 1,585 521 95.65 4.03 9,394 1,011 
Population Density 2009 1,581 525 98.22 1.43 9,269 1,028 
African American Percent, 2012 1,595 3.64 0.80 0 99.3 9.54 
African American Percent, 2009 1,593 3.33 0.70 0 94.4 8.97 
Latino Percent, 2012 1,595 1.75 0.80 0 26.7 2.76 
Latino Percent, 2009 1,593 1.53 0.60 0 34.3 2.77 
Senior Citizen Percent, 2012 1,595 26.99 26.90 0 65 7.58 
Senior Citizen Percent, 2009 1,593 26.16 25.10 0 81.8 7.59 
College Degree Percent, 2012 1,595 11.69 9.80 0 100 8.36 
College Degree Percent, 2009 1,593 11.06 9.00 0 100 8.25 
Unemployed Percent, 2012 1,595 8.90 8.20 0 38.6 5.22 
Unemployed Percent, 2009 1,593 7.25 6.60 0 38.1 4.53 
Median Household Income, 2012 1,594 $53,339 $51,099 $0 $250k $19,049 
Median Household Income, 2009 1,593 $52,137 $49,886 $0 $250k $18,961 
DEM Candidate Visits, 2012 1,593 0.02 0 0 4 0.18 
DEM Candidate Visits, 2008 1,593 0.02 0 0 3 0.18 
GOP Candidate Visits, 2012 1,593 0.03 0 0 4 0.22 
GOP Candidate Visits, 2008 1,593 0.03 0 0 4 0.22 
Total Candidate Visits, 2012 1,593 0.05 0 0 6 0.35 
Total Candidate Visits, 2008 1,593 0.05 0 0 6 0.35 
DEM Ads, 2012 1,593 18,236 17,943 0 30,136 9,199 
DEM Ads, 2008 1,593 9,475 10,446 333 12,642 3,410 
GOP Ads, 2012 1,593 16,771 19,480 0 24,276 7,656 
GOP Ads, 2008 1,593 7,492 8,246 1,392 9,487 2,392 
Total Ads, 2012 1,593 35,006 37,423 0 54,412 16,677 
Total Ads, 2008 1,593 16,967 18,710 2,151 22,129 5,686 
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Table 2:  Spatial Autocorrelation Diagnostics 
 
Diagnostic 
Models 
2008 Vote Share 2012 Vote Share 2008 Turnout 2012 Turnout 
Moran’s I 26.05 31.62 39.79 23.44 
AIC - OLS 8,859 8,491 -5,428 -6,035 
AIC - Spatial 8,52 8,055 -6,053 -6,323 
R2 – OLS 0.89 0.93 0.59 0.76 
R2 - Spatial 0.92 0.95 0.74 0.81 
N 1,580 1,585 1,580 1,585 
Dependent variables:  Democratic candidate’s share of the two-party vote in 2008 and 2012; 
Democratic candidate’s change in performance from 2004 to 2008 and 2008 to 2012. 
Explanatory variables:  X and Y county subdivision centroid coordinates, X and Y coordinates 
squared, and X*Y. 
AIC statistics provided for full OLS model. 
Bolded text indicate statistical significance at the p < 0.001 level. 
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Table 3:  Effects of Field Offices on Vote Share, 2008-2012 
 
Variables 
Models 
2008 2012 
Field Offices   
Democrat 0.08 
(0.13) 
0.19* 
(0.09) 
GOP  -0.74* 
(0.44) 
0.22 
(0.22) 
Controls   
Pop. density  0.10*** 
(0.13) 
0.35** 
(0.12) 
African American 0.20*** 
(0.01) 
0.05*** 
(0.01) 
Latino 0.15*** 
(0.04) 
0.12*** 
(0.03) 
Senior Citizen 0.00 
(0.01) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
College Degree 0.09*** 
(0.02) 
-0.04** 
(0.02) 
Unemployed 0.08*** 
(0.02) 
0.02 
(0.02) 
Median Household 
Income 
-0.02** 
(0.01) 
-0.03*** 
(0.01) 
Dem Visits 0.76 
(0.53) 
-0.30 
(0.39) 
GOP Visits -0.19 
(0.44) 
-0.33 
(0.39) 
Dem Ads 0.33* 
(0.14) 
-0.09 
(0.09) 
GOP Ads -0.18 
(0.44) 
0.11 
(0.09) 
Dem percentt-1 0.70*** 
(0.01) 
0.81*** 
(0.01) 
Other   
Constant 11.29*** 
(1.01) 
8.47*** 
(1.53) 
Lambda 0.76*** 
(0.03) 
0.74*** 
(0.03) 
R2 0.92 0.95 
AIC 8,502 8,055 
N 1,580 1,585 
Population density, median household income, and ads are divided by 1,000.  Standard errors are 
in parentheses.  Lagged Democrat percent in the 2008 model is John Kerry’s share of the vote 
from 2004; for 2012 it is Barack Obama’s 2008 performance. 
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001  
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Table 4:  Effects of Field Offices on Voter Turnout, 2008-2012 
 
Variables 
Models 
2008 2012 
Field Offices   
Democrat 0.32** 
(0.13) 
0.27** 
(0.10) 
GOP  0.22 
(0.45) 
-0.14 
(0.23) 
Controls   
Pop. density  -0.58*** 
(0.13) 
-0.17 
(0.13) 
African American -0.02* 
(0.01) 
0.05*** 
(0.01) 
Latino -0.06 
(0.04) 
-0.07* 
(0.03) 
Senior Citizen 0.05*** 
(0.01) 
0.03* 
(0.01) 
College Degree 0.10*** 
(0.02) 
0.03* 
(0.017) 
Unemployed -0.09*** 
(0.02) 
-0.07*** 
(0.01) 
Median 
Household 
Income 
0.05*** 
(0.01) 
0.04*** 
(0.01) 
Total Candidate 
Visits 
-0.44 
(0.25) 
-0.34 
(0.23) 
Total Ads 0.08* 
(0.03) 
0.07 
(0.11) 
Turnoutt-1 51.01*** 
(1.58) 
41.40*** 
(1.65) 
Other   
Constant 27.98*** 
(1.47) 
32.12*** 
(1.80) 
Lambda 82.47*** 
(2.41) 
73.37*** 
(3.13) 
R2 0.74 0.81 
AIC -6,053 -6,323 
N 1,580 1,585 
Population density, median household income, and ads are divided by 1,000.  Standard errors are 
in parentheses. 
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001 
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Endnotes 
1     Of the eleven battleground states in 2008, the presence of a county field office was 
significant in only Florida, Indiana, and North Carolina.  In Colorado, Iowa, Missouri, Nevada, 
New Mexico, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Virginia, field offices were not a statistically significant 
factor. 
2     Information on the Obama/Biden 2012 offices comes from the campaign website, which lists 
the address of each field office (http://www.barackobama.com).  Information on the 
Romney/Ryan field offices comes from their campaign website, which also lists the address of 
each field office (http://mittromney.com).  Information on the location of the Obama/Biden 
2008, McCain/Palin, and Kerry/Edwards offices comes from George Washington University’s 
Democracy in Action websites (http://www.gwu.edu/~action/2008/obama/obamaohfield.html, 
http://www.gwu.edu/~action/2008/mccain/mccaingenoh.html, and 
http://www.gwu.edu/~action/2004/kerry/kerrohcoord.html).  Unfortunately, specific addresses 
are not available for the six Bush/Cheney 2004 Victory Centers spread around the state. 
3     The Cincinnati McCain office was nearly next-door to an Obama field office, and is difficult 
to see on the map.  The same occurred with the Obama and McCain offices in Brecksville, a 
Cleveland suburb in south-central Cuyahoga County. 
4     For 2008, we use the 2005-2009 5-year ACS data as this is the first 5-year increment 
available.  For 2012, we use the 2008-2012 5-year ACS data.  ACS data can be accessed at 
http://factfinder2.census.gov/faces/nav/jsf/pages/index.xhtml.  
5     AIC is founded in information theory and measures the amount of information lost.  A lower 
AIC indicates less information loss.  The AIC value is: 𝐴𝐼𝐶 = 2𝑘 − 2 ln (𝐿), where k is the 
number of parameters in the model, and L is the maximized value of the likelihood function for 
the model.  See Akaike (1974) for more information. 
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